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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred witji jurisdiction over 
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF! REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred by Concluding that an 
objective standard is to be exclusively utilized when ruling on a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea. The appellate court reviews a 
trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for 
abuse of discretion. State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, 1fl0, 983 
P.2d 556. However, the trial court's interpretation of statutes, 
rules, or binding case law presents a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, fl2, 
114 P.3d 585 (quoting State v. Ostler, 2001 
528) (statute); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, ^17, 977 
P.2d 1201 (statute); State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d [738, 741 (Utah 1997) 
(binding case law); and Stevenson v. Goodson\, 924 P.2d 339, 346 
(Utah 1996) (binding case law). 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
UT 68, K5# 31 P.3d 
Mr. Kucharski preserved this issue by way off Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea and supporting Memorandum set fourth in the record at 
R. 97-101. 
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2. Whether the sentencing court, by failing to duly 
consider the objections to the presentence report and thereby 
failing to specifically resolve them on the record, failed to 
comply with its legal duty to properly resolve presentence 
investigation report objections. "Whether the sentencing court 
properly complied with a legal duty to resolve on the record the 
accuracy of contested information in sentencing reports is a 
question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for 
correctness." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, fl3, 6 P. 3d 1133 
(citing State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f32, 999 P.2d 7). 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Mr. Kucharski preserved this issue by way of his Objection to 
Presentence Report set forth at R. 138-48. 
3. Whether trial counsel, to the extent that there was no 
affirmative request that the sentencing court exercise its fact 
finding function to resolve the remaining presentence report 
objections, denied Mr. Kucharski of his Sixth Amendment right to 
the effective assistance of counsel. To make such a showing, a 
defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered a deficient 
performance, falling below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance was 
prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988). The 
appellate court reviews such a claim as a matter of law. State v. 
2 
Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, f5, 122 P.3d 895; State v. Maestas, 
1999 UT 32, 1)20, 984 P.2d 376; State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of grounds for Review: 
Issues involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
constitute an exception to the preservation rijile and as such may 
be raised for the first time on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
U.S. Const. amend. VI 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, if 
any, are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the 
body and arguments of the instant Brief of Apjpellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Mr. Kucharski with one count of 
Communications Fraud, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-18-1801. Mr. Kucharski pleaded not guilty to the 
charge. 
On October 25, 2005, Mr. Kucharski appeared with appointed 
trial counsel before the district court pursUant to a negotiated 
plea and entered a plea of no contest to Communications Fraud, a 
third-degree felony. 
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Thereafter, Mr. Kucharski appeared before the district court 
m conjunction with the appearance of newly retained trial counsel 
and thereafter filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. The 
district court denied the Motion. 
At sentencing, the district court imposed an indeterminate 
term of zero to five years m the Utah State Prison on Mr. 
Kucharski. Mr. Kucharski filed a timely pro se Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The State charged Mr. Kucharski with one count of 
Communications Fraud, a second-degree felony, m violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-18-1801 (R. 1). See Information, R. 1, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached as Addendum A to this Brief of 
Appellant. 
2. The basis for the aforementioned charge arose out of the 
State's allegation that Mr. Kucharski, m March 2004, agreed to 
and then failed to install windows for the alleged victim for 
which Mr. Kucharski took and cashed a check (R. 1-2). 
3. Mr. Kucharski subsequently pleaded not guilty to the 
charge (R. 11). 
4. On October 25, 2 005, Mr. Kucharski appeared with 
appointed trial counsel before the district court pursuant to a 
4 
negotiated plea and entered a plea of no contest): to Communications 
Fraud, a third-degree felony (R. 208:3-5). 
5. As part of the plea agreement, Mr. Kilicharski would have 
an ''affirmative 402 Motion upon successful completion of 
probation" with the State recommendation of ^o prison and no 
incarceration (R. 30). 
6. The same day Mr. Kucharski entered the no contest plea, 
he executed a Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and 
Certificate of Counsel (R. 28-32) . See Statement of Defendant in 
Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel, R. 28-32, a 
true and correct copy of which is attached as| Addendum B to this 
Brief of Appellant. 
7. Mr. Kucharski failed to appear fd>r sentencing after 
which the court issued a no bail bench warrant (R. 33). 
8. After arrest, Mr. Kucharski appeared before the district 
court in conjunction with the appearance of newly retained trial 
counsel, who informed the court of Mr. Kupharski's desire to 
withdraw the no contest plea (R. 208:11-12). 
9. On October 5, 2 0 06, Mr. Kucharjski, through trial 
counsel, filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and supporting 
Memorandum, arguing that Mr. Kucharski did n|ot voluntarily enter 
his guilty plea (R. 97-101). 
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10. That same day, Mr. Kucharski, through trial counsel, 
filed a Motion to Dismiss based on a lack of jurisdiction (R. 102-
05) . 
11. The State responded in opposition to the Motions (R. 
112-16). 
12. On October 19, 2006, the district court entertained 
arguments on the Motions (R. 208:14:10-15). 
13. Addressing the merits of the Motion to Dismiss, Mr. 
Kucharski's trial counsel essentially conceded jurisdiction but 
argued that venue was improper (R. 208:14-15). 
14. During the hearing on the Motion to withdraw the no 
contest plea, Mr. Kucharski testified that his appointed trial 
counsel had failed to subpoena witnesses he had provided to his 
appointed trial counsel, which, in turn, provided him with no 
other option but to plead guilty (R. 208:18-19). 
15. Appointed trial counsel, who was also called as a 
witness, testified that he did not subpoena any witnesses due to 
Mr. Kucharski's acceptance of the negotiated plea, "which would 
effectively reduce the conviction down to a class A misdemeanor." 
(R. 208:33:1-8) .l 
Appointed trial counsel subsequently admitted that he did not 
talk to all of the witnesses provided to him by Mr. Kucharski but 
that the ones he contacted would not have been beneficial to the 
matter (R. 208 :45-46) . 
6 
16. The district court denied the Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea, concluding that an objective standard id to be utilized in 
the course of considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea (R. 
208:57-58).2 See transcript of district court^s ruling on Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea, R. 208:57-58, a true find correct copy of 
which is attached as Addendum C to this Brief of Appellant. 
17. In conclusion, the trial court directed that a 
Presentence Report be prepared for sentencing (R. 208:58-59). 
18. On March 13, 2007, Mr. Kucharski, thfough trial counsel, 
filed an Objection to Presentence Report (R. 138-48) . See 
Objection to Presentence Report, R. 138-48, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached as Addendum D to this Brief of 
Appellant. 
19. At sentencing, without addressing the objections to the 
Presentence Report, the district court sentenced Mr. Kucharski to 
an indeterminate term of zero to five year$ in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 208:80-81). 
20. The Sentence was signed by the district court on March 
29, 2007, and subsequently entered on April 13, 2007 (R. 168-69). 
21. On May 10, 200, Mr. Kucharski fitLed a timely pro se 
Notice of Appeal (R. 175-76). 
2The trial court ruled that the denial of' the Motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea caused the Motion to Di$miss to be moot (R. 
208:58:20-23) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court erred by concluding that an objective 
standard is to be exclusively utilized when ruling on a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea. By so doing, the trial court failed to 
utilize at least a mixed objective-subjective standard in the 
course of considering Mr. Kucharski's Motion to withdraw his plea 
of no contest. By utilizing a purely objective standard in the 
course of ruling on the Motion, the trial court failed to consider 
unrefutted testimony that appointed trial counsel did not talk 
with and subpoena defense witnesses prior to the scheduled trial. 
Only on the eve of trial did Mr. Kucharski learn that none of his 
requested witnesses had been subpoenaed for trial. Consequently, 
Mr. Kucharski did not enter his no contest plea of his own free 
and choice. Rather, the plea was entered involuntarily under the 
duress of appointed trial counsel's failure to investigate and 
subpoena requested defense witnesses. 
2. By failing to duly consider the objections to the 
presentence report and thereby failing to specifically resolve 
them on the record, the sentencing court failed to comply with its 
legal duty to properly resolve presentence investigation report 
objections. The record demonstrates that the sentencing court 
failed to duly consider all the inaccuracies set forth in the 
Presentence Report. 
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After recognizing that the objections h^d been filed, the 
district court subsequently sentenced Mr. Kucharski to an 
indeterminate term of zero to five years in theiUtah State Prison. 
The sentencing judge's general statement concerning the 
inaccuracies of Mr. Kucharski's report is insufficient. In fact, 
the sentencing judge failed to make the specific findings on the 
record as mandated by statute. By failing to duly consider the 
inaccuracies, the sentencing court did not compjly with its duty to 
properly resolve Mr. Kucharski's objections. 
3. To the extent that there was no affltfmative request that 
the sentencing court exercise its fact finding[function to resolve 
the remaining presentence report objections, trial counsel denied 
Mr. Kucharski of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. Trial counsel's faiL 
objective standard of reasonable professional 
lure fell below an 
judgment. This is 
to request that the 
demonstrated by existing Utah case law, as previously discussed, 
the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a), and the 
underlying factual circumstances of this case. 
But for counsel's unprofessional failure 
sentencing court utilize its fact finding function, the result at 
sentencing would have been different. AP&P, I among other things, 
I 
failed to accurately describe Mr. Kucharski's criminal history and 
attitude-orientation in the course of its evaluative assessment. 
Had the sentencing court been alerted of its obligation, the court 
more likely than not would have duly considered the inaccuracies 
set forth in the presentence investigation report, which, in turn, 
would have allowed the sentencing court to more fully and 
accurately consider AP&P's recommendation for imprisonment at 
sentencing. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT AN 
OBJECTIVE STANDARD IS TO BE EXCLUSIVELY UTILIZED 
WHEN RULING ON A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A GUILTY PLEA, 
The appellate court reviews the trial court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to an abuse-of-
discretion standard. State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, ^10, 983 
P. 2d 556. Nevertheless, when the trial court's denial involves an 
interpretation of a statute or binding case law, the appellate 
court is presented with a question of law, which it reviews for 
correctness. See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, fl2, 114 P.3d 585 
(quoting State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, f5, 31 P.3d 528) (statutory 
interpretation); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, [^17, 977 
P.2d 1201 (statutory interpretation); State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 
738, 74] (Utah 1997) (binding case law interpretation); and 
Stevenson v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 346 (Utah 1996) (binding case 
law interpretation). 
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Before accepting a guilty plea, the 
determine that "the plea is voluntarily made" 
P. 11(e) (2) . u[T]he substantive goal of rule 
trial court must 
See Utah R. Crim. 
tLl is to ensure that 
pn [to withdraw the 
JLuntary." State v. 
), cert, denied, 853 
defendants know of their rights and thereby Understand the basic 
consequences of their decision to plead guilty)." State v. Visser, 
2000 UT 88, fll, 22 P. 3d 1242. "The trial coufrt's compliance with 
Rule 11 does not foreclose the possibility tfhe court abused its 
discretion in refusing the defendant's moti 
guilty plea] if his plea was in fact invo 
Thorup, 841 P. 2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 19921 
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Moreover, u x f or a plea of guilty to be 
valid it must appear that the accused had a clear understanding of 
the charge and without undue influence, coercion, or improper 
inducement voluntarily entered such plea.'" 
P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Forsyth, 560|P.2d 337, 338 (Utah 
1977) ) . 
Mr. Kucharski, through trial counsel, iiled a timely Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea and supporting Memorandum, arguing that he 
did not voluntarily enter the guilty plea due to appointed trial 
counsel's failure to subpoena witnesses in preparation for trial 
(R. 97-101) . At the hearing on the Motion, Mr. Kucharski 
testified that his appointed trial counsel Had failed to subpoena 
State v. Thorup, 841 
11 
witnesses he had provided to appointed trial counsel, which 
resulted in him having no other option but to plead guilty (R. 
208:18-19). Appointed trial counsel, who was also called as a 
witness, testified that he did not subpoena any witnesses due to 
Mr. Kucharski's acceptance of the negotiated plea, "which would 
effectively reduce the conviction down to a class A misdemeanor." 
(R. 208:33:l-8) . 
Immediately following the hearing, the trial court denied the 
Motion, concluding that an objective standard is to be exclusively 
utilized in the course of considering a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea (R. 208:57-58). In the course of its ruling, the 
trial court stated: 
Unless there is something from the Utah Supreme 
Court or the U.S. Supreme Court or the Utah Court 
of Appeals that says that a judge who asks these 
questions, goes through what the judge is supposed 
to go trough [sic] with this form of plea 
affidavit that we have, and gets statements from 
the defendant, I believe that there's no -- no 
standard that says that I have to then go back 
secondhand and say if somebody later after the 
fact says, judge what I told you was a lie and I 
really didn't mean it, that it can't be -- I can't 
see how it can be a subjective standard because if 
it is a subjective standard, then every person 
that we have asked and gone through, you know, 
hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of defendants 
over the last number of years, then every one of 
them can come back and say, well, judge, despite 
that, that wasn't true. 
See R. 208:57-58. 
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According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-13 -6 .(2) (a) , UA plea of 
guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upoii leave of the court 
voluntarily made." 
on the matter. In 
and a showing that it was not knowingly and 
Prior case law is somewhat more instructive 
State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996), thk Utah Supreme Court 
held that the guilty plea at issue on appeal was not knowing 
because the defendant did not understand the elements of the crime 
in spite of his unequivocal statements to th[e contrary. Id. at 
375. Significantly, the Court, in support ofi its holding, placed 
substantial importance on defendant's repeated statements that he 
did not have the requisite intent and his specific refusal to 
admit to certain consequences. Id.; see also State v. Martinez, 
2001 UT 12, fl8, 26 P.3d 203 (relying on defendant's declarations 
that he "didn't want to go through a trial because [he] didn't 
want to put [the victim's mother] . . . through the emotion and go 
through the hurt" in the course of affirming J trial court's denial 
of motion to withdraw guilty plea). Additionally, in State v. 
Thorup, 841 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), clert. denied, 853 P.2d 
897 (Utah 1993), this Court, in the course of affirming the denial 
of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, ^tated the following: 
As to the assertion that [defendant's] 
attorney used undue influence, the evidence 
presented shows nothing more than an attorney 
counseling the defendant and his family with 
regard to what he considers tfo be the best 
13 
approach, knowing all of the facts from the 
defendant's point of view and giving his 
considered judgment and advice to the defendant 
and his family that the plea barg[a]m was m the 
defendant's best interest . . . . The court could 
not find from evidence presented on this question 
that [defendant's attorney] in any way abandoned 
his representation for economic reasons or because 
of pressures from the family to change his advice 
and reject the plea bargain and enter a plea of 
not guilty. 
Id. at 748. 
In light of the foregoing Utah case law, the trial court 
failed to utilize at least a mixed objective-subjective standard 
in the course of considering Mr. Kucharski's Motion to withdraw 
his plea of no contest. By utilizing a purely objective standard 
in the course of ruling on the Motion, the trial court 
misinterpreted the applicable statutory and binding case law 
applicable to such an issue and thereby failed to consider 
unrefutted testimony that appointed trial counsel did not talk 
with and thereby subpoena defense witnesses prior to the scheduled 
trial. Only on the eve of trial did Mr. Kucharski learn that none 
of his requested witnesses had been subpoenaed for trial. 
Consequently, Mr. Kucharski did not enter his no contest plea of 
his own free and and choice. Rather, the plea was entered 
involuntarily under the duress of appointed trial counsel's 
failure to investigate and subpoena requested defense witnesses. 
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II. BY FAILING TO DULY CONSIDER THE OBJECTIONS TO THE 
PRESENTENCE REPORT AND THEREBY FAILING TO 
SPECIFICALLY RESOLVE THEM ON TH^ RECORD, THE 
SENTENCING COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WlTH ITS LEGAL 
DUTY TO PROPERLY RESOLVE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION 
REPORT OBJECTIONS. 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6)(a), which provides 
in relevant part: 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have nop been resolved 
by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of 
the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an 
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged 
inaccuracies of the report with the department. 
If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot 
be resolved, the court shall make |a determination 
of relevance and accuracy on the rbcord. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a); see also Statfe v. Maroney, 2004 UT 
App 206, f26# 94 P. 3d 295. "Whether the trial court properly 
complied with a legal duty to resolve on the record the accuracy 
of contested information in sentencing reports is a question of 
law that [the appellate court] review[s] for 
v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 13
 # 6 P. 3d 1133 (c 
2000 UT 35, 1|32, 999 P.2d 7). 
correctness." State 
'iting State v. Kohl, 
A. Duty to Consider Objections to Presentence 
Investigation Report 
As a matter of compliance, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6)(a), 
"requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's objections 
I 
to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the 
15 
information objected to is accurate, and determine on the record 
whether that information is relevant to the issue of sentencing." 
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^44, 973 P. 2d 404; State v. Maroney, 
2004 UT App 206, f26, 94 P. 3d 295. "If a party fails to challenge 
the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time 
of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (b) . 
B. Failure of Sentencing Judge to Duly Consider 
Objections and Resolve the Inaccuracies 
The record demonstrates that the sentencing court failed to 
duly consider the inaccuracies set forth in the Presentence 
Report. Prior to sentencing, Mr. Kucharski, through newly 
retained counsel, filed an 10-page Objection to Presentence Report 
(R. 138-48). Some of the objections appear to have been resolved 
but, contrary to counsel's representation at sentencing, not all 
of the objections were resolved as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1. 
After recognizing that the objections had been filed, the 
district court subsequently sentenced Mr. Kucharski to an 
indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The sentencing judge's general statement concerning the 
inaccuracies of Mr. Kucharski's case is insufficient. Cf. State 
v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, fl4, 6 P.3d 1137. In fact, the sentencing 
16 
judge "failed to make the specific finding^ on the record as 
mandated by the statute." Id. at fl5. 
consider the inaccuracies, the sentencing c 
with its duty to properly resolve Mr. Kuchar^k 
By failing to duly 
cpurt did not comply 
i's objections. 
III. TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE WAS 
REQUEST THAT THE SENTENCING COUR? 
FACT FINDING FUNCTION TO RESOLVE 
PRESENTENCE REPORT OBJECTIONS, 
DENIED MR. KUCHARSKI OF HIS SIXTH 
TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
#0 AFFIRMATIVE 
EXERCISE ITS 
THE REMAINING 
TRIAL COUNSEL 
AMENDMENT RIGHT 
The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), established a two-prong test 
for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment3 right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
courts - requires a 
(rendered a deficient 
ich performance fell 
S.Ct. at 2064. This test - adopted by Utah 
defendant to show "first, that his counsel 
performance in some demonstrable manner, wh| 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment 
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 19 
899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); 
P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
); State v. Perry, 
State v. Wright, 893 
rt
 [T]he right to the 
The Sixth Amendment to the United Stated Constitution states in 
relevant part that u[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
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effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the 
accused to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, a fair 
sentencing. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 
838, 842, (1993). 
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must 
"'identify the acts or omissions7 which, under the circumstances, 
'show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. "' State v. Templin, 805 P. 2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). A defendant must "overcome 
the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment." State 
v, Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 
U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support ua 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. UA reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P. 2d 516, 522 (Utah 
18 
1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 4J31 (1994); State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
To the extent that trial counsel failled to specifically 
request that the sentencing court exercis^ its fact finding 
function to resolve the remaining inaccuracie^ in the presentence 
report, he committed ineffective assistance 
counsel's failure fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment. This is demonstrated by existing Utah case 
I 
law, as previously discussed, the plain languajge of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(6)(a), and the underlying factual circumstances of this 
of counsel. Trial 
case, 
But for counsel's unprofessional failure) 
sentencing court utilize its fact finding function, the result at 
sentencing would have been different. AP&P, 
failed to accurately describe Mr. Kucharski's 
to request that the 
among other things, 
criminal history and 
attitude-orientation in the course of its evaluative assessment. 
I 
Had the sentencing court been alerted of its obligation, the 
court more likely than not would have duly considered the 
inaccuracies set forth in the presentence investigation report, 
which, in turn, would have allowed the sentencing court to more 
fully and accurately consider AP&P's recommendation for 
imprisonment at sentencing. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Kucharski respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his Motion to 
Withdrav/ Guilty Plea and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's determination. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th da June, 2 0 0 8 
& WIGGINS, P.C, 
L jWiq^jms 
y^s ~r*Qr Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prbpaid, two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF QF APPELLANT to the 
following on this /flQ day of July, 2008: 
Mr. J. Frederic Voro^, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, 
Counsel for t" 
*4114-0854 
tte of Utah 
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MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
P. O Box 618 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone (801)451-4300 
Fax: (801)451-4328 
M -'Li iQ')\0 
,.}H SA L . o r n f l i 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF fJTAH 
DISTRICT 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDDIE G. KUCHARSKI 
DOB 07/27/1977 
Defendant 
Bail: 
INFORMATION 
Case No 
OTN 
D H h o l ^ O ^ 
The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant, 
either directly or as a party, during March through May, 2004 at County |of Davis, State of Utah, 
committed the crime of: TlK— 
iifj*f COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, (542) 76-10-1801 UCA.Ia « ^ j f i degree felony, 
as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly devised a scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain |from another money or 
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions, and who, as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with 
a person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud; '"]TiP--
and the value of the loss or the thing sought to be obtained was or excee d^d S f , 0 0 0 ^ t ^ ^ ^ ® S ( ^ ^ 
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Lynn Hooper. 
Authorized September 18, 2 
for presentment and 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
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FILED 
OCT 25 2005 
Layton District Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL!DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
EDDIE G.KUCHARSKI 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OH GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
I, EDDIE G. KUCIIARSKI, hereby acknowledge and certify that I havi been advised of and that 
I understand the following facts and rights: 
6 
Notification of Charges « 
I am pleading guilty to the following crime(s): -B. 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
(\ miwuri v^ikr fYtoJ} 
Degree 
'*fe|(*/f oS^jJ'kwt fifoj 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against mc. I havte read it, or had it read to 
mc, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty. 
The dements of the crimefa) to which I am pleading guilty are; / 
&k 
I O 
i UJ 
! o 
Q 
i UJ 
[ c* a: 
5< feu 
52 
o 
ji/k/Y- mffakZL 
Shi.^A^Us WUj&Vt 
syirJMIrtm. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting Wat I comnktted the crimc(s) listed 
above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons 
for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to apeept my guilty pica and 
prove the elements of the crimc(s) to which I am pleading guilty; 
OCT-25-05 TUE 08:51 ATI .AVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY FAX NO, 4b»-J28 P. 02 
1. In March of 2004, the defendant met with the victim and represented that he was employed 
with Champion Windows and that they would install windows at the victim's home. The victim agreed to 
have the windows installed and agreed to pay $8,335.00 as down payment and to cover the cost of the 
windows. 
2. Defendant insisted that the victim make the check out in his name rather than Champion 
Windows. The victim made the check payable to defendant and defendant cashed the check. 
3. Defendant then failed to produce the windows or do any work on defendant's home. In 
addition, the victim has been unable to contact the defendant and no longer knows his whereabouts. 
When Champion Windows was contacted, they slated that defendant did work for them but as of May 27> 
2004 he had quit and moved away. 
4. In addition, Champion Windows stated that they have never received a work order or request 
to do work at the victim's home. That defendant did not turn over any money from the victim or order 
any windows or other material on behalf of the victim. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering this pica voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the 
constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up all the 
following rights; 
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if 1 cannot afford 
one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to mc. I understand that I might later, if the 
judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and cnme(s) to which I am pleading guilty. I also 
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea. 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is £^\f\A. / W / ^ n A u)^> 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my 
guilty pica. 
Jury Trfali 1 know that I have a right to a speedy and public (rial by an impartial (unbiased) jury 
and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, 
(a) 1 would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and (b) my attorney, 
or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the 
witnesses who testified against mc. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know thai if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I 
chose to and I woidd be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those 
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privUcgo against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, no one 
2 
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could make mc testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know th t^ if I chose not to testiry, 
the jury would be told that Ihey could not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I am 
presumed innocent until the Slate proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s). Jf I choose to fight the 
charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty/' and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State 
would have the burden of proving each element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is 
before a jury, Ihe verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be admitting 
that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted bV a jury or judge, I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence, If 1 could not afford the costs of an appeal, the State 
would pay those costs for me, I understand that I am giving up my right to Appeal my conviction if I 
plead guilty. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the statutory and 
constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequence! of Entering a Guilty Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which 
1 am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be 
subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know myl sentence may include a 
prison term, fine, or both, 
I know that in addition to a fine, an cighly-fivc percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimc(s), including 
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison teiins. I know that if there is more jhan one crime involved, 
the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the same time 
(concurrently). 1 know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crirrje that I plead to. I also 
know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offeiise of which I have been 
convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me, If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on 
parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless |the court finds and states 
on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
Pica bargain. My guilty plea is the result of a plea bargain between rrn/self and the prosecuting 
attorney, All the promises, duties, and provisions of ihe plea bargain, if any, aj-e fully contained in this 
statement, including those explained below: , ~ r . 
.
 T lv„cmyf _ , 
CriiMPo(ftk\. tf ptjifojihwj /hJf'AJ/jrn^J(«t%^. $'AAA 
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Trial judge not bound. 1 know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any 
opinions they express to mc as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant5! Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful influence 
of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this 
statement have been made to mc. 
I have road this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements arc correct, 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. , fl 
1 any^ft years of age, I have attended school through the /( grade, I can read and 
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to me. 
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment 
when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or 
intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding 
these proceedings and the consequences of my pica. I am free of any mental disease, defect, or 
impairment that would prevent mc from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily entering my plea, 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty pica, I must move to withdraw my pica before 
my sentence is announced. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show it was not knowingly 
and voluntarily made. w; <r\ , ^^^ 
Dated t h i s ^ ^ j : day of C'Crd O^. _, 2 0 0 ^ 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that 1 am the attorney for EDDIE Q, KUCHARSKI, the defendant above, and that I know 
defendant has read the statement or that I have read it to defendant; I have discussed it with defendant and 
believe that defendant fully understands the moaning of its contents and is menially and physically 
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of 
4 
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the crimc(s) and tho factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct arc correctly stated; and these, 
along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant iiUh^fbfcgbfii^a^fidaYit, are 
accurate and true. /*^V\ / ? I (fj 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
J certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against EbDEE G. KUCHARSKf, 
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's 
criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, 
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in 
the Statement and m the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. 
"lliere is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the 
offense(s) for which the pica is entered and that the acceptance of the ri6a>j>6uld serve the public interest. 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and 
counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the Signatures and finds that 
the defendant's guilty plea is freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea to the cnme(s) set forth in the 
Statement be accepted and entered, ,. J 
Dated this 
5 
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FROM THE UTAH SUPREME COURT OR THE U.S. SUPREME COURT OR THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS THAT SAYS THAT A JUC)GE WHO ASKS THESE 
QUESTIONS, GOES THROUGH WHAT THE JUDGE IS SUPPOSED TO GO 
TROUGH WITH THIS FORM OF PLEA AFFIDAVIT TFlAT WE HAVE, AND 
GETS STATEMENTS FROM THE DEFENDANT, I BELiEVE THAT THERE'S 
NO -- NO STANDARD THAT SAYS THAT I HAVE T(j) THEN GO BACK 
SECONDHAND AND SAY IF SOMEBODY LATER AFTEft THE FACT SAYS, 
JUDGE, WHAT I TOLD YOU WAS A LIE AND I REALLY DIDN'T MEAN IT, 
THAT IT CAN'T BE — I CAN'T SEE HOW IT CA^ J BE A SUBJECTIVE 
STANDARD BECAUSE IF IT IS A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD, THEN EVERY 
PERSON THAT WE HAVE ASKED AND GONE THROUGfji, YOU KNOW, 
HUNDREDS AND HUNDREDS AND HUNDREDS OF DEFENDANTS OVER THE 
LAST NUMBER OF YEARS, THEN EVERY ONE OF TflEM CAN COME BACK 
AND SAY, WELL, JUDGE, DESPITE THAT, THAT iftfASN' T TRUE. AND I 
DON'T FIND A BASIS BOTH EITHER IN THE TEStlMONY OR IN THE 
VIDEOTAPE OR IN THE RECORD TO INDICATE TH^T THIS WASN'T 
KNOWING, VOLUNTARILY, AND KNOWINGLY MADE, AS THE REQUIREMENT 
THAT I HAVE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE DEFENDANT DOES ENTER A PLEA 
THAT WAY. 
SO I'M DENYING THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA. HAVING 
DENIED THAT MOTION, THE MOTION TO DISMISS! IS REALLY MOOT. SO 
IN LIGHT OF THAT THEN — I GUESS WE'VE NE^ /ER HAD A 
PRESENTENCE REPORT, HAVE WE? 
MR. LARSEN: I DON'T BELIEVE SO, YOUjR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. THEN, I'M GOING T|O ASK THAT A 
— 1 
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PRESENTENCE REPORT BE PREPARED AND SENTENCING TAKE PLACE ON 
NOVEMBER 30TH. IS THAT AGREEABLE TO ALL PARTIES? 
MR. LARSEN: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE? 
MR. JARDINE: LET ME LOOK HERE. 
THE COURT: THAT'S A THURSDAY. 
MR. JARDINE: I HAVE THE AFTERNOON AVAILABLE IF THAT'S 
WHEN IT IS — 
THE COURT: YES, ONE O'CLOCK. 
MR. JARDINE: DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ELSE THAT AFTERNOON. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 1 P.M. ON THE 30TH? OKAY. ANYTHING 
FURTHER ON THIS MATTER? 
MR. JARDINE: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. 
* * * * * 
FARMINGTON, UTAH NOVEMBER 30, 2006 
THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, WHAT — WHAT DO WE HAVE LEFT? 
MR. JARDINE: WE HAVE A MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE ON A 
SENTENCING, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: WHICH ONE IS THAT? 
MR. JARDINE: KUCHARSKI, NUMBER 15 (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
THE COURT: WHICH NUMBER? 
MR. JARDINE: NUMBER 15. 
THE COURT: STATE OF UTAH VERSUS EDDIE KUCHARSKI. 
MR. JARDINE: IF I MAY, YOUR HONOR. 
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The Law OfScec of Nkthan N. Jardioc 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801/994-9985 
Fax: 801/519-8745 
Attorney for Defendant, Eddie Q. Kucharski 
FILED AT BENCt-
OOURTROOWI 2 
MAR 13 2007 
Uyton Diitrict Court 
CTTHE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS C0UNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT. STATE OF U^AH 
State of Utah 
Plaintiff, 
va. 
Eddie Kucharski 
Defendant 
Objection to Prejseatence Report 
Case No, 04-17^11630 
Judge Thomas l[. Kay 
. . . i n . *• — • 1 ' • ,„i • . « • . . . , , . . 
TO ALL PARTIES AND TBECR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD; 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Eddie Kucharski by and through h^ attorney of record, Nathan 
NL Jardine, hereby objects to the Presentence Report dated February 16,20(^7, for the following reasons: 
1, On page 2* the second fiill paragraph, the Presentence Report indicates that Eddie Kucharski 
purchased a vehicle with a $38,000.00 bad check. Mr. Kucharski relates th t^ in June or July of 2007* he 
purchased a vehicle from Quality Dodge in Tooele, Utah. At the time he pi^chased the vehicle^ he 
issued a check with the understanding that the check would not be cashed ujtfil Mr. Kucharski received 
ftmds from a sponsor. Eddie Kucharski is the manager/owner of H&^Motbr Sports. H&K Motor 
Sports is involved in the Nascar team business. Mr, Knchaxski's business clwns several different race 
CDf95124J8 
041701630 KUCHARSKf,£pCM£ G 
Z/^C0OWV9^O'-UZ0OZ/O2/C 
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cars and teams* Mr. Kucharski believed at the time that they check was issued that ha would be able to 
have the $38,000.00 within a three-week time frame because he anticipated the^Mes^omingJn^nom^ 
^neufthe^p^sSsof one of his teams. Mr. Kucharski was arrested while they were awaiting for the 
money to oome in from the sponsor. The car dealership understood the dynamics of this situation and 
bleached his agreement by cashing the check which is why, in part, the matter was dismissed. 
2. Mr. Kucharski indicates that at the first court appearance in this matter the prosecution told 
him that they were in the process of dismissing the matter. Three weeks later, the matter was dismissed, 
The car dealer was not out any money whatsoever due to the feet that Mr, Kucharski paid him for 
depreciation on the car. The statement in the Presentence Report that the district attorney had to actually 
file felony charges in order for the defendant to agree to return the vehicle is incorrect and inaccurate. 
3. Defendant objects to the second Ml paragraph on page 2 ofthe Presentence Report which 
starts "A^tud^OriMitatiQn.* In that paragraph, the Presentence Report indicates "The defendant7s 
explanation of the offense is completely contradictory to that of his victim and to the employer he 
exploited," Eddie Kucharski believes that he did not exploit his employer. This offense arose from a 
situation where Eddie Kucharski worked for Champion Windows and Patios (Champion). He agreed 
with the manager of Champion, Greg Shuaoway, that he could do some window joba on the side. Greg 
Shunoway agreed that Eddie Kucharski could do the window jobs with the only stipulation that they 
purchased the windows from Champion. One of the people that Eddie Kucharski agreed thai he would 
do a window job for was a person by the name of Lanny Hansen who is the victim in this case. Eddie 
2 
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Kucharsid agreed with Lanny Hansen that he would do the windowjobftyr Lanny Hansen. Hetooka 
deposit from Lanny Hansen. He asked Greg Shunoway to order the wind|)w3>^mX3ieg^SkifflowayTSeva 
ordered the windows.^Consequeatfy,^^^ could not install tfye windows in Lanny Hansen's 
home. Aa a result ofthe windows not being installed. Lanny Hansen vms| unhappy and made a criminal 
complaint against Eddie Kucharski. Eddie Kucharski then has had to fao^ the criminal charges. The 
employer in this matter, Champion, was not exploited. In feet, the employer wronged Eddie Kucharsid. 
4. It is Eddie Kucharski's understanding that both he and Champion were sued as a result of the 
problem. Eddie Kucharsid was informed by Brett Klackston that Champion had actually cut a check to 
Lanny Hansen in settlement of the matter, 
5. Prom the day that Eddie Kucharski received the service of a lawsuit, until the day that he was 
supposed to be sentenced last year, he Indicates that be was in negotiation^ with the civil attorney far 
Lanny Hansen in order to resolve the matter. He offered to install windows fiom a different company 
and he offered to make substantial payments since he no longer had the deposit given him by Lanny 
Hansen, but nothing was ever finalized between himself and Lanny Hansen's attorney. 
6. On page 2, the second sentence of the" Attitude-Orientation" paragraph* the Presentence 
Report Investigator indicates "He claims to have 'returned the deposit* in Ijiis statement of the offense,*1 
The feet of the matter is that a careful reading of the defendant's statement! of the offense could lead to 
the conclusion that when Eddie Kucharskl indicated that he ''returned the deposit he was talking about 
the deposit for a different job, not the job related to the Lanny Hansen ordfr 
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As a matter of clearing up the Presentence Report, Eddie Kucharski hereby informs the court that 
at the time that he took on the job for Lanny Hansen, he also took on a paxiojob^tApersoariythrMme 
of Greg Williams. At Jfcejsame^bcaelxe^ms doing the job for Greg Williams he found out that he 
couldn't get the materials through Champion. As a result of that he couldnt get the materials so at that 
point Eddie Kucharski returned .the deposit cm the patio job for ChegWUlian^ 
deposit on the window job for Lanny Hansen because Gisg Shunoway was still Indicating at thai point 
that the windows were going to be forthcoming, but they never were. In any evexd, there b a statement 
in the Presentence Report that indicates he claims to have "returned the deposit/ The reality is that 
when Eddie Kucharski claims to return the deposit, he was talking about the deposit to Qreg Williams 
for the patio job, not the deposit to Lanay Hansen for the window job, 
7. In the fourth sentence of the Attitude^Qrientation paragraph, the Presentence Report 
Investigator indicates "The defendant actually tries to absolve himself from full responsibility by placing 
blame on his manager at the time/ Even in Eddie Kucharsld's statement, he indicates that he feels bad, 
"1 feel horrible that Lanny lost money. That was never intended.... I am working two jobs to pay Laxmy 
back." Obviously, Eddie Kucharski is not trying to absolve himself from full responsibility by placing 
blame on the manager at the time. Clearly, however, the manager was at fault Eddie Kucharski 
indicates that the manager was fired, terminated from his job, due to the dealings that occurred with 
respect to this matter and for other similar reasons. 
8. Eddie Kucharski disputes sentence 5 of the A^fofo-Qneftfetion paragraph of the Presentence 
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Report which indicates that "The fact is he never submitted the work ordeif for the windows, insisted that 
the victim issue the checks directly to himself, and then cashed the checks IthroujJxhis^ersotadxh^B^ 
account" Tliefeerjofthe-fflatteri^ to the arrangement that E^die Kucharski had with the 
manager at the time, Greg Shuaoway* he was to tell Greg that there were Windows and more materials 
that were needed, and Greg Shuno way was to order those windows or materials. Eddie Kucharski would 
then receive the materials and do the job on his own time. That was the arrangement thai Eddie 
Kucharski had with bis manager, It was a win-win situation for all. Champion would receive money for 
the materials that were ordered from them and Eddie Kucharski would mal^ e money on the side. 
However, there was never an arrangement between Eddie Kucharski and tlie manager of the store, Greg 
Shnnoway, that he would submit a work order for the windows. That was hot part of the arrangement. 
The Presentence Report makes it seem as though Eddie Kucharski should have issued a work order for 
the windows* 
Of course, the victim, Lanny Hansen, was required to pay Eddie Kucharski directly for the work 
due to the fact that Eddie Kucharski was not working for Champion when $c agreed to install the 
windows, rather he was working for himself as an independent contractor, ^ddie Kucharski arranged for 
the windows and materials to be delivered from Champion and was going tb perform the work himself. 
Of course, the victim was to pay him directly for the windows, Eddie Kucharski did not cash the 
payment for the windows through his personal checking account, in feet, E4die Kucharski cashed the 
checks through Lanny Hansen's checking account He juat simply cashed tlie checks that were delivered 
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to him by his customer. 
9. The last sentence in the Attitude-Orientation paragraph indicates "The drf^dant^at^tude-acd' 
orientation is to miaiini2£4is4nvolvBm^ The fact of the matter is that the defrnriflnfa 
attitude is to clear up what actaaUy CKxurred as for as the Eddie 
Kuchatrski knows and understands that he should not have spent the money that was given to him. He 
knows that it was a big mistake to use the money for his personal use when he should have reserved it to 
do the job for which he was hired, He recognizes that that was one of the biggest mistakes of his life due 
to the foot that he did not have the money to Lanny Hansen when Greg Shunoway failed to order the 
windows and the windows were never delivered- Eddie Kuchaxski has now spent 87 days in jail due to 
this matter. 
The reason Eddie Kucharski was performing side jobs is because he needed extra money because 
his son had spent two weeks in the ICU and he had a huge hospital bill to pay. Additionally, Eddie 
Kucharski was being promoted in the company he worked for at the same time of the alleged events* 
The promotion involved a move to Dallas, Texas* The move was not being paid for by the company, so 
Eddie Kucharski used the money for hospital bills and moving expenses for his family. He recognizes, 
however, that he should not have used the money for anything except for performing the work for the 
customer who had paid him in advance for his services. 
As Eddie Kucharski understands it, the work that he was going to do for Lanny Hansen was going 
to be done and that the materials were going to be paid for by Champion. Champion was going to be 
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taking money out of his paychecks for the cost of the windows. The labor that was going to be 
accomplished would be accomplished by Eddie Kucharski, It would b^ve only taken hiauwo-dayslo 
complete toe job, 
10, With respect to the paragraphs under "INVESTIGATOR C0MMENT* on page 2 of the 
Presentence Report, Eddie Kucharski admits that the current wrongdoir^g occurred during the time that 
he was on supervised probation. He also admits that there were plans f<fr the supervised probation to be 
terminated. In fact, the supervised probation was in fact terminated successfully. 
Eddie Kucharski did successftdly complete supervised probation^ The feet of the matter i$ thai at 
the end of 1997 through the end of 2000, he did rack up a series of crimiinal charges. His probation was 
revoked and reinstated twice; however* Eddie Kucharski also believes thiat he will certainly perform well 
on probation if he is only given the chance. Once again, his last probation 61d end successfully. 
11. Lanny Hansen has told Eddie Kucharski that he is i^coinmenling to the prosecutor and the 
court that no additional time be served by Eddie in this matter, Mr, Hausten knew that Eddie Kucharski 
was working independently from Champion when he agreed to do the woWc on Lanny Hansen's home. 
Mr. Hansen knew that was the reasouhe was getting the windows done a^  a discounted r ^ . Eddie 
Kucharski did not teil Lanny Hansen that the windows were a promotional deal as indicated on page 3, 
first fiill paragraph, sentence 3 of the Presentence Report He did tell Lan^y Hansen that he would do 
the work cheaper than he could get the work done through Champion. Th£ amount of $10,398.00 was 
paid to Eddie Kucharski by Lanny Hansen. 
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When Mr. Hansen contacted Eddie Kucharski, as indicated on page 3, in the first Ml paragraph 
of the Presentence Report Eddie Kucharski did inform Mr. Hansen the work hadiM>ea^ Lelayedl50eaus^  
he had a femilyjdeatlHn^allasrrexas, and the delay was also caused by the fact that he hadn't received 
the windows from Champion yet. 
Yet, the manager of Champion, Greg Shunoway, told Lanny Hansen that Eddie Kucharski had 
"possibly moved to Arizona*, for the probable reason that Greg Shunoway wanted to cover up his own 
wrongdoing in the matter. As indicated above, ultimately, the manager, Greg Shunoway, was fired from 
his job for the dealings that he made in this instance as well as other instances similar to this incident 
Of course, the manager of Champion never received a work order due to the feet that the work was not 
done through Champion, it was done through Eddie Kucharski. 
Eddie Kucharski never submitted a work order to Champion. Eddie Kucharski did give Mr. 
Hansen a document which indicated the location and measurements of windows. Apparently, Mr. 
Hansen sent that document to Champion and was informed that the document was not valid- The 
Presentence Report also indicates oa page 3, the second Ml paragraph, the last sentence, "Evidently the 
work order had a substantial amount of missing information." The feet of the matter is that there was 
never ft work order that was submitted to Champion by Eddie Kucharski or from Mr. Hansen to Eddie 
Kucharski. It was only a work sheet where Eddie Kucharski worked out the size of the windows and the 
prioe be would need to install the windows. 
12, With respect to the third Ml paragraph on page 3 of the Presentence Report Eddie Kucharski 
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will provide documents to the court on the day of the sentencing in this chatter which indicate that Eddie 
Kucharald did not quit the company on May 27,2006. In fact, te wasfaa^sfeg^o Dallft yTcxa^oBror 
about that date. 
13. With respect to the fourth foil paragraph on page 3 of the Presentence Report, Eddie 
Kucharsld never received any messages which were allegedly left by the police on his "tctftt cell 
phone." 
14. With respect to paragraph one under "CUSTODY STATUS114>f the Presentence Report, 
defendant served 52 days in the Davis County Jail and an additional 30 d^ iys in Maricopa County, 
Arizona, and an additional 14 days in Tooele County on these charges. 
15. With respect to paragraph HE. PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY", the feet of the matter is 
that from 1999 through 2002, the defendant was having a very difficult tit^e in his life* Hewentthrough 
a divorce and was suffering from the mental illness of bipolar disease which was untreated at the time. 
Many of the criminal offenses that are shown occurred from the same episode of criminal history. In 
other words, Eddie Kucharsld was not on probation at the time that he coijtfnittcd the offense EXCEPT 
for the check that was issued in 2000 and, EXCEPT offense (6) indicated >^n the Presentence Report 
which was committed in 2002. Eddie Kuoharslri is now being treated for iiis bipolar illness with 
medication from a psychiatrist at LDS Hospital, He also receives counseling on a monthly basis. He has 
remarried and has two children with his current wife. In the event that Ed<|tte Kucharski is required to 
serve any significant time in jail or prison, his current wife and children will have no way to pay for their 
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needs. 
16. With resect to the "VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT AND R E S i m m O N , , - o n ^ ^ 
the Prefientencc Report, once again, Eddie Kucharski is sorry that the Hansens lost their money. He is 
sony that he did not keep the deposit that they paid him so that he could pay it back to them. He did 
believe that he was going to be able to accomplish the work for them but he was wrong. He has spoke 
with Lanny Hansen who has indicated that Lanny Hansen has no ill feelings towards Eddie Kucharski 
and that Lanny Hansen does not want to see Eddie Kucharski incarcerated for another period of time. 
17. With respect to the third to the last full paragraph, second sentence, on page 7 of the 
Presentence Report, it is indicated "The defendant also works for H&K Motor Sports in their public 
relations office." Eddie Kucharski owns H&K Motor Sports. Similarly, sentence 4 of the same 
paragraph it states 'Trom 1997 until 2004, the defendant was employed with Computex as a Sales 
Representative," Eddie Kucharski owned Computex and was not just a Sales Representative. Eddie 
Kucharski was making approximately $100,000.00 per year when he owned Computex, but he did 
dissolve the company to start a career in racing cars. He believed at the time and continues to believe 
that there is much more money involved in racing cars than there is in. computers* 
DATED: February 28,2007 
Attorney for Defendant 
Respectfully sui 
Nathan M Jardine 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the February 28,2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Objection to Presentence Report was served by facsimile and United States First Class Mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Richard L. Larsen, Esq. 
Davis County Prosecutor 
800 West Stat© Street 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Fax: (801)451-4328 
Lee Kenney, Investigator 
Blake Beesley, Supervisor 
Adult Probation and Parole 
Farmington A. P. & P. 
883 West 100 North 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Fax No 
Nathan N. Jardine 
Kv&B&PO0.OtycctlOR to fattcteocc Repottftnj 
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